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Writing in 1857, Hinton Helper predicted that “three-quarters of a 
century hence, if slavery is abolished within the next ten years, as it ought 
to be, the South will, we believe, be as much greater than the North, as 
the North is now greater than the South.“’ To a Northern observer of the 
1970s generous enough to allow Mr. Helper the leeway of a half-century 
or so, his prognosis seems uncomfortably accurate. But in the nineteenth 
century, it was the poverty and disappointment of freedom which seemed 
most striking, the weakness and apparent perversity of the South’s re- 
sponse to its own liberation. These are the central themes of One Kind of 
Freedom: the limited range of choices actually open to freedmen, the 
thwarted hopes for landownership, the stifling of progressive energies by 
exorbitant credit costs and racial barriers, the failure of the Southern 
economy to progress toward the national norm. As Helper’s example 
attests, one could attempt to diminish the indictment by taking a longer 
view of the matter, by asking for a longer “time for adjustment” as it 
were, or by placing the South and the freedmen in a worldwide rather than 
merely a national comparative contest. Since historical conditions are 
seldom permanent, and since there are innumerable choices of compara- 
tive standards, this strategy can hardly fail; relativities like these are the 
historians’ stock-in-trade. 
In this essay I too propose to examine One Kind of Freedom in a 
broader context, not to celebrate the long-run outcome of the develop- 
ments deplored by Ransom and Sutch, but to show the elements of 
ambiguity and relativity in the economic issues under debate. Historians 
thrive on relativity and altered perspective, but we economists tend to 
carry on our debates as though our terms and categories were firm and 
immutable. We need to be reminded that the past contains multiple 
realities; a simplifying abstraction which successfully captures the es- 
sence of some historical situation for some purpose should not be con- 
fused with the history itself. Many of the analytical distinctions and 
1 Helper 1857, p. 142. 
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working presuppositions which economists have brought to the study of 
the postbellum South are not, in my view, well suited to unraveling 
important parts of that history. My purpose, however, is not to preach a 
new nihilism but to identify some points of implicit consensus and to 
propose an alternative organizing framework which yields operational 
suggestions for research. 
ECONOMISTS AND HISTORICAL THINKING 
Two aspects of economists’ thinking that are relevant for my purposes 
are (1) the treatment of static allocational efficiency in product and factor 
markets as a norm, and (2) the neglect or the unhistorical treatment of risk 
and uncertainty. Nonhistorical economists might well express astonish- 
ment at these two items, since economics journals are filled these days 
with proposed models of market failure, models of behavior in the pres- 
ence of risk and uncertainty, models of imperfect information and transac- 
tions costs, models of altruistic behavior, malicious behavior, political 
behavior, and random behavior, models of dynamic disequilibrium be- 
havior, models of Marxian economic relations, and many more. Econom- 
ics is not so narrow-minded as it is often depicted, but I believe these two 
phrases do aptly describe the economics that cliometricians have applied 
to history, and the explanation is not that cliometricians are poor 
economists. No one could possibly approach history or any empirical 
economic research with an infinity of theoretical possibilities in mind. 
Instead cliometricians do what all historians do, they come to history with 
a working conception of how an idealized economy works, which they 
commoniy draw from the mainstream of conventional economics, and 
they examine the historical record either for confirmations or for devia- 
tions from that conception. In taking an efficient market resource alloca- 
tion as a norm and then searching for deviations and exceptions, historical 
economists follow the format of economics teaching. Typically, students 
learn first the optimal&y properties of general competitive equilibrium in a 
world of profit-maximizing firms and utility-maximizing individuals; the 
instructor then moves through a conventional list of situations where 
these optimality rules are violated-xternal effects, monopoly power by 
firms or other organizations, consumer ignorance, racial discrimination, 
dynamic learning and technological developments, inequitable distribu- 
tional results-and discusses the merits of government intervention in 
each case. 
It is not necessarily true that this approach implies an antireform bias 
toward the status quo, nor a strong belief that markets do, by and large, 
work for the best. To prove this assertion with a counterexample, we need 
look no further than Ransom and Sutch, whose major research energies 
are devoted towards showing deviations from the competitive equilib- 
rium: (1) in their treatment of slavery, they emphasize the exploitation 
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which resulted from the fact that slaves were denied access to a free labor 
market; (2) their interpretations of debt peonage revolves crucially around 
the argument that merchants established territorial monopoly power in 
credit markets; (3) they define “overproduction” in terms of the relation- 
ship between the ratio of cotton and corn prices on the one hand, and the 
marginal rate-of-transformation in production on the other; (4) they fault 
sharecropping because it allowed land-labor ratios to differ inefficiently 
on farms of different tenure types; (5) and they view racial discrimination 
as resulting in large part from faulty beliefs by whites in innate racial 
inferiority. This list does not do justice to the many subtleties and insights 
in the connecting narrative, but these are the hypotheses which are 
formally developed and stressed. The purpose of the list is not to launch a 
refutation of these propositions, but to argue that Ransom and Sutch’s 
definition of the important issues has largely been shaped by the focus on 
competitive equilibrium as a norm. And in common with many other 
economists, they tend to presume that the important factors in determin- 
ing the rate of economic progress for blacks and for the South are closely 
related to the allocational efficiency of the Southern economy. 
The organization of discussion around deviations from a competitive 
norm may be useful in many respects, but it is only one of many 
possible organizing principles, and it is highly abstract and simplified. 
Despite appearances, most of the issues which derive from this framework 
are not objective and well defined, because of the existence of risk and 
uncertainty in the real world. For example, “overproduction” in the 
Ransom-Sutch sense cannot be conclusively tested because cotton and 
corn yields were variable and uncertain, and the interacrion between 
cotton and corn yields in a context of uncertainty is a complex, probabilis- 
tic phenomenon. Similarly, monopoly power is not sharply definable in a 
context of risky loans for risky purposes, spatial competition, and price 
discrimination. The spatial theorist Melvin Greenhut writes that “the 
inclusion of economic space requires recognition and acceptance of un- 
certainty as a basic property of the system. We also . . . find that 
economic space, uncertainty, and oligopoly go hand-in-hand.“2 My point 
in making these observations is not to say that the Ransom-Sutch 
categories are meaningless or useless, but only to argue that we need to 
ask not so much whether these analyses are precisely true, but how well 
these abstractions really capture the most essential elements of the histor- 
ical situation. On some of these points, it appears that the attempt to 
translate contemporary comments into this economic framework has led 
them into some conceptions which are narrower and weaker than they 
need to be. 
Now cliometricians frequently do have to confront the reality of risk 
z Greenhut 1970. p. 4. 
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and uncertainty in the world, and when they do, they draw on a large 
economic literature. But the concept of uncertainty as it is used by 
nonhistorical economists is nonhistorical; by and large, uncertainty is 
treated as riskiness, which is an intrinsic attribute of an asset or an 
activity, and when cliometricians appropriate these theories, they merely 
broaden the notion of equilibrium to include premiums for riskiness. This 
approach to risk is a common dimension of the otherwise quite different 
analyses of sharecropping advanced by Robert Higgs and Joseph D. Reid, 
Jr? Changes in these institutions over time are taken to be moving 
equilibria, responses to changes in riskiness or in the degree of risk- 
aversion in the population. In this way uncertainty is reduced to certainty 
equivalence, without any essential effect on the character of the analysis. 
This approach is useful in analyzing sophisticated financial markets, but it 
does violence to history and historical modes of thought. The record of 
Southern history from the Civil War until World War I is not fifty years of 
“riskiness” but is simply a recording of fifty outcomes of activities carried 
out in a context of uncertainty. As historians we ought to entertain and 
indeed make the most of the notion that many of these outcomes were 
unlikely; and since in the historical mode of thought, these games of 
chance were not independent but serially connected, much of the whole 
history may have been improbable in some reasonable sense of that term.4 
From this vantage point, there is an essential indeterminacy to the debate 
over whether the merchant’s credit charges were “justified” by risk, 
since we have only ex post measures of default and variance to go by. 
This is only one example of the widely demonstrated proposition that it is 
difficult and often impossible to infer behavioral or utility functions from 
observed market outcomes.5 
Let me propose a methodological strategy which might help us to 
escape the present impasse. First, in the hopes of focusing on objective 
and operational rather than subjective and unresolvable issues, I suggest 
that we reduce our attention to questions of motivation and tests of optimiz- 
ing behavior, and concentrate instead on identifying the relevant con- 
straints on choices, the set of options actually open at any time to tenants, 
landlords, merchants (and the economy as a whole), and how these 
changed over time. Second, I suggest that we focus on a magnitude which 
is objective, which constrains choice, and whose determination reflects a 
cumulative historical process, namely wealth. Third, I suggest that we not 
look for the “representative” tenancy or the typical credit market struc- 
ture (monopoly or competition), but that we analyze explicitly the dis- 
tribution of the relevant population in both the spatial and statistical 
3 See Reid, 1973, 1976; Higgs, 1973, 1977, pp. 50. 67-68. 
’ For an analogous argument, see Crafts, 1977. 
5 See Sanderson, 1974; Sonnenschein, 1973. 
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senses of that term. The following sections explore some of the disputed 
issues with these precepts in view. 
LABOR SUPPLY, LAND, AND WEALTH 
A major contribution of One Kind of Freedom is the finding that most of 
the decline in output after the war is attributable to the reduction in 
effective labor supply from the black population, a reduction which they 
estimate to be between 28 and 37% per capita. Whether the labor-supply 
effect accounts for the whole of the fall in per capita output between 1860 
and 1880 (or whether there is significant room for an additional loss of 
plantation scale economies) remains a bone of contention; but there 
seems to be a consensus on the reality and significance of this voluntary 
withdrawal of labor from the fields. In their text, Ransom and Sutch 
demonstrate that mules were in ample supply after the war (p. 49); they 
minimize the burden of replacing the farm capital physically destroyed by 
the war (p. 50), and they give particularly short shrift to cultivable land as 
a factor of production on the grounds that “the war did not, of course, 
literally destroy the land. Therefore, with the decline in the labor supply it 
is obvious that the land-labor ratio must have risen” (p. 48). They note 
that the “improved acreage” reported in the 1870 census was actually 
20% below the level of 1860, suggesting that “only limited scope existed 
for increasing the land-labor ratio” (p. 48). 
This all seems clear. But there is a surprise waiting if we actually 
compute the ratio of acreage to effective workers on the slave plantations 
of 1860 and black family farms of 1880. Using the information on p. 184 of 
One Kind of Freedom, we find that the black family farms of 1880 
averaged 7.5 acres of crops per worker, or 3.0 acres per family member. 
Applying relatively generous adjustments for improved acreage other 
than cropland, these figures translate into roughly 9.4 and 3.7 improved 
acres, respectively. In the Parker-Gallman sample, plantations with more 
than 50 slaves averaged 8.4 improved acres per capita, or more than 9 
improved acres for each member of the black population. In other words, 
far from attempting to increase the land-labor ratio with emancipation, 
planters actually reduced the per capita allotment of improved acreage by 
about 60%, a reduction roughly twice the size of the per capita withdrawal 
of black labor. One may quarrel over precise measures and over the 
representativeness of these two classes, but the conclusion that the labor 
intensity of cotton cultivation actually increased is difficult to escape in 
the aggregate. In the five-state area, the ratio of rural population to 
improved acreage was more than 40% greater in 1880 than it had been in 
1860, a good bit more than the black labor-supply effect can account for. 
Ransom and Sutch have overlooked this development because their refer- 
ences to land are to the aggregate stock, whereas their analysis of labor 
supply is in per capita terms. 
FREEDOM AND THE SOUTHERN ECONOMY 95 
These considerations do not, of course, falsify the Ransom-Sutch 
contention that the withdrawal of black labor was the dominant develop- 
ment of the postwar economy, but they lead me to wonder whether they 
have told the full story. Their estimates (pp. 232-236) are heavily weighted 
by observation in the late 1860s and early 1870s. Their description of a 
persistent “labor shortage” rings true for that period, and it is difficult to 
see how else to account for the useable acreage standing idle in 1870 “for 
the want of labor.” But by 1880 improved acreage had returned to its 1860 
level, and it is not evident that good cotton land was in surplus. There is 
reason to believe that labor markets were much softer in the late 1870s 
than they had been a decade before. This was partly a political deveiop- 
ment, as the federal government abandoned their efforts to police Southern 
labor relations, and freedmen reluctantly abandoned aspirations to inde- 
pendent farmownership. But the changed climate also reflected underly- 
ing trends in the Southern economy, particularly the continuing pressure 
of population and the steady deterioration of the cotton price between 
1866 and 1879. The accelerated growth of the Southern textiles industry, 
which required an ample supply of cheap labor (but which employed few 
blacks) dates not from the 1860s but from the late 1870~.~ The small black 
family farms of 1880 were cultivated so intensively (Ransom and Sutch, 
pp. 183-185) that one has to wonder whether the families could profitably 
have clocked more hours if they had wanted to. 
The welfare interpretation of the hours of labor is thus fraught with 
ambiguities. It seems utterly reasonable that free black families would 
want to work less than slaves, but it is worth remembering the modern 
studies which indicate that the self-employed work much longer hours 
than wage laborers.’ One man’s leisure time may be another man’s dis- 
guised unemployment, and what began as a new liberation may have been 
transformed over time into a new constraint. Gallman and Anderson have 
argued plausibly that “changes in the work proclivities of freedmen may 
not have been altogether a product of their choice . . . [because] labor no 
longer had the character of fixed capita1 to the p1anter.“8They propose that 
the revolution in property rights changed the effective principles of re- 
source allocation, and their argument directs our attention to the impact of 
wealth on the behavior of planters. The search for a summary measure of 
efficiency may have caused us to overlook a more fundamental develop 
ment, but we would never see it if we insist upon a “long-run” framework 
where detached producers respond only to the relative.prices of factors of 
production. 
B The timing of the acceleration is documented in Grit&, 1964, pp. 48-49. Testimony on 
the labor-supply effects of the falling cotton price may be found in Griffin, p. 46; Smith, 1960, 
p. 6; Mitchell, 1921, p. 145. 
’ Scitovsky, 1976, pp. 94-95. 
* Gallman and Anderson, 1977, p. 41. 
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Wealth is also critical in the labor-supply behavior of workers, as we 
may learn from a recent theoretical analysis of slavery by Yoram Barzel? 
Barzel develops a model similar to Fogel and Engerman’s, in which the 
profit-maximizing behavior of slave owners compels the slave to work 
longer and with greater intensity than an unconstrained freeman, produc- 
ing more output and (because of the harder work) consuming more food. 
In a brief but significant section, Barzel goes on to show that exactly the 
same combination of work and output would be produced by a con- 
strained freeman who is burdened by the need to repay a debt which is 
just equal to the net exploitation of a slave. Barzel observes that the 
comparison of free and slave equilibrium points “can be viewed as con- 
tinuous and dependent on the level of wealth” (p. 91). My own view is 
that the higher apparent productivity of slave labor had more to do with 
specialization in market production than with the intensity of labor time. 
But the general message-that the constraints of debt can produce a 
self-coercion analogous to the outright coercion of slavery-ought to give 
us pause. No one would argue that the work patterns of slavery were 
restored, but liberally interpreted along crop-mix lines, Barzel’s model fits 
the facts: When free farmers were impelled by indebtedness to move into 
production for the market, the cotton price settled at the same level as in 
the days of slavery. 
FARM TENANCY AND CROP MIX 
This brings us to the question of why the resources of Southern agricul- 
ture in 1880 were so much more fully devoted to cotton than they had 
been in 1860. The real issue is explaining the dramatic decline of self- 
sufficiency in basic foodstuffs. The recent literature contains many 
hypotheses about the motives and behavior of farmers, landlords, and 
merchants in this connection. Ransom and Sutch point to the insistence 
by lenders that borrowing farmers plant a certain quantity of cotton as a 
precondition for credit; the behavior of the merchant is said to involve not 
merely a demand for collateral, but an effort to “drive the farmer into 
increased dependence upon purchased supplies” (p. 161); these require- 
ments are said to have locked in debtor-farmers to overproduction of 
cotton (pp. 16%168).‘O Critics of this analysis have denied that merchants 
possessed monopoly power in credit markets, disputed the claim that 
merchants controlled planting decisions (or would have done so in a 
detrimental manner), and have doubted whether cotton was “over- 
produced” in any reasonable sense.” 
There are obviously many different opinions here, but there is an 
8 Barzel, 1977. 
lo A more detailed elaboration may be found in Ransom and Sutch, 1975. 
I1 Besides the papers of Goldin and Temin, see DeCanio, 1974, pp. 111-118, 241-261; 
Higgs, 1977, pp. 57-59, 71. 
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COTTON 
FIG. 1. The choice between cotton and corn. 
essential core explanation to the main historical change which need not be 
controversial if we focus on objective constraints rather than motives. 
That is the proposition that self-sufficiency is not possible on very small 
tenant farms, where the tenant has borrowed substantially to get through 
the crop year. Refer to Fig. 1, adapted from Ransom and Sutch (1975). 
which illustrates the production possibility choices between cotton-and 
corn: line ME denotes the corn requirements of the farm; at point S 
expected profits are maximized; and line DD (the slope of which reflects 
the relative prices of cotton and corn) represents the level of indebted- 
ness. 
In 1860 small farms were self-sufficient at a point like E, despite the fact 
that this choice did not maximize profitst2 we may not agree on precisely 
why they chose this point (whether it was risk, leisure preference, ignor- 
ance, or something else), but whatever their reasons, it is evident that that 
choice was no longer open to a small farmer with indebtedness DD. If one 
prefers to stress the labor-leisure trade-off, one could draw the analogous 
diagram (following Barzel) with much the same implications. As Temin 
notes, it is difficult to say but not really important whether the tenant 
himself takes the initiative in expanding his cotton acreage in order to pay 
back his loan, or whether (as it might appear to the tenant) the merchant’s 
insistence is the essential element. But Temin’s phrasing illustrates the 
importance of focusing on constraints: 
I2 An extended review of the antebellum self-sufficiency literature which appeared in an 
earlier draft has been omitted here to conserve space. A helpful survey may be found in 
Gallman and Anderson, 1977, pp. 32-39. 
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The cost of borrowing, was a sunk cost at the time of planting. Irrespective of 
what he planted he would have to pay interest to the merchant to get through the 
year. But this interest should not have been a factor in his decision of what to plant. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The first point is valid and important-that the need to borrow is prior to 
and independent of the subsequent planting. The second is the 
economists’ familiar slogan: Bygones are bygones, and sunk costs do not 
matter. But that is only true if farmers intend to maximize profits at all 
times: If they had intended to do something substantially different, as they 
typically did in 1860, then the bygones of history did matter, because their 
legacy (the debt) ruled out options, which, for one reason or another, 
many farms had chosen in the less constrained situation of 1860. Further- 
more, we need not agree on the theoretical reasons for the high interest 
rates by merchants, in order to see that the higher the interest charges, the 
heavier the burden of the debt will be, and the further the tenant will be 
pushed into cotton. One need only glance at the differences in cotton- 
intensity on owned and rented farms (Ransom and Sutch, p. 157) to see 
how clear the association is between the rise of cash obligations and the 
shift into cotton. 
Some writers have characterized the difference between Ransom and 
Sutch and their critics as a debate over whether “the market works” or 
not. But this is an ambiguous criterion: One can reasonably argue that 
Fig. 1 describes the way in which markets do work, not by magically 
equilibrating marginal trade-offs at every instant, but by pushing produc- 
ers towards an efficient crop mix (albeit, with the possible sacrifice of 
some nonpecuniary goals). As the discussion at the Duke conference 
made clear, there is no technical issue of substance over the notion of 
“overproduction”: No economist now defends the view that merchants 
forced production of cotton to the right of point S in Fig. 1, at least in 
normal years. The remaining differences revolve around more subjective 
considerations: Can we understand contemporary use of that term sym- 
pathetically, so as to enhance our understanding rather than demonstrate 
our more rigorous terminology? “Overproduction” is a knee-jerk- 
reaction word for economists: They hear it and they think “fallacy.” 
When they read contemporaries bemoaning food imports as a drain on 
regional wealth, economists are sure they are dealing with utter economic 
ignorance. But economists should not react so quickly: If the elasticity of 
demand were unity, as it seems to have been for at least a substantial 
range, the belief that food imports were a net drain on the South was 
precisely correct. The South could have obtained the same cotton earn- 
ings producing less, and the homegrown food would be strictly gravy. 
There was thus a resonance between the optimal regional allocation and 
the traditional means of maintaining small-farm independence, which 
should help us to appreciate the continuing temptation of intellectuals to 
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draw colorful parallels between the micro and macro developments. It 
didn’t take an intellectual cotton farmer, however, to appreciate the fact 
that at the micro level, the loss of self-sufficiency involved a basic change 
in the character of social relations. With or without monopoly power, the 
debt was held by someone, and that creditor was bound to show a keen 
interest in the farmer’s reliability, diligence, crop choice, spending habits, 
and so on; the farmer in the clear and self-sufficient at point E, in contrast, 
didn’t have to take manure from anyone. 
But Ransom and Sutch clearly describe a more involved calculation, in 
which the merchant did not merely try to ensure repayment of his exorbi- 
tant loans, but attempted to determine the wealth position of the farmer at 
the end of the year, so as to ensure his patronage in the following season. 
This is a difficult calculus to document, but it appears from their text (pp. 
162-165) that Ransom and Sutch believe such a mechanism is needed to 
explain thepersistence of indebted situations like Fig. 1. If self-sufficiency 
were attractive and credit expensive, why shouldn’t small farmers have 
escaped from their dependent positions at the first opportunity? However, 
a reasonable simulation exercise might show that it just wasn’t that easy 
to climb out of an initial indebted position with the earnings of a small 
family farm. For a family which begins without wealth, given the acreage 
on a typical tenancy, given plausible estimates of subsistence require- 
ments and interest rates, is it in fact true that any crop mix between points 
2 and S would have allowed the accumulation of enough net worth to 
make possible a return to self-sufficiency-given the actual course of 
prices and yields over a particular span of time? This is, at any rate, an 
operational approach which might serve to reduce the bounds of dis- 
agreement. A farmer might say that he is trying to “escape the clutches of 
the merchant” in much the same sense that we all try to escape the 
clutches of the dentist or the undertaker-not so much because he is a 
monopolist but because he is providing a service we would rather not 
consume. The likelihood that the observed patterns of farm wealth, with 
the persistence of indebtedness and specialization in cotton, can be gen- 
erated by the impersonal historical record in this way, is enhanced by the 
realization that the small-farm, low-wealth categories were constantly 
being replenished by the pressure of population. Ransom and Stitch’s 
figures show (Table 8.3, p. 159) that a substantial majority of farms of 
medium scale or larger did in fact achieve self-sufficiency in foods. 
THE DETERMINATION OF FARM SIZE 
Ransom and Sutch consider the analysis of the previous section incom- 
plete. Figure 1 may characterize the position of an indebted landowner 
with a small holding, or a share tenant after his contract has specified the 
plot size; but to the landlord (and perhaps ex ante to the tenant), the size 
of the plot was open to determination. In their view, establishing the 
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amount of land to be leased served as a supplement to supervision as an 
instrument of labor control, ensuring labor intensity in cultivation. Since 
“labor intensity” can be translated into “cotton intensity” with little loss 
of accuracy, we can view the crop mix as determined (implicitly or 
explicity) in the bargain over the plot size (pp. 97-99, 348). 
The impulse to move towards labor intensity in comparison with an- 
tebellum practices is clearly explained by Gallman and Anderson. A 
slaveowner with limited or costly access to a rental market will try to fill in 
the work year as fully as possible; with his net investment dominated by 
the value of the slaves, he will try (approximately) to maximize the value 
of output per worker, assigning each hand as much acreage as possible. 
But when his property consists of the land alone, and labor is hired by the 
day or the month, the employer will cut out all labor activities which don’t 
“pay for themselves” at the going wage. Alternatively, we can view him 
as now attempting to maximize the value of output per acre; since there is 
no disputing the superiority of cotton over food crops in terms of their 
yield per acre, this meant a shift toward cotton. As the Gallman- 
Anderson analysis would predict, emancipation transformed the planters’ 
attitude toward regional inflows of labor.13 And while economists fre- 
quently point to the spread of railroads and marketing channels and the 
rise of commercial fertilizer as alternative explanations for the shift into 
cotton, we can (with a certain license for hyperbole) view the favorable 
atmosphere for all of these developments as a manifestation of the 
planter’s newly developed desire to augment the value of his land and 
maximize the value of output per acre.14 
Returning to the micro level, the question becomes whether renting and 
sharecropping produce the same allocation pattern that landlords would 
have desired in dealing with wage labor. The answer seems to be that 
many landlords were able to use tenancies of both kinds to much the same 
effect by keeping plots small, encouraging and enforcing labor and 
cotton-intensity. As Joan Robinson and John Eatwell argue, describing a 
hypothetical sharecropping economy, “the landlord gains most when the 
holdings are small and the level of intensity of cultivation so high as to 
maximize output per acre. . . . From the landlord’s point of view, the 
smaller the holding per tenant the better, provided that it is not so small 
that the tenant families are unable to live.“15 
Now the success of the planter in this endeavor is only possible if labor 
lJ See Berthoff. 1951: “Plantation owners led the movement to bring in foreigners” (p. 
328). 
” The “penetration” of the South by railroads and Northern merchants is described, in 
somewhat conspiratorial terms. by Woolfolk (1958). On the spread of cotton processing 
facilities and Southern urbanization, see Weiher, 1977. On the fertilizer industry, see Taylor. 
1953. 
l5 Robinson and Eatwell. 1973, p. 70. 
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can be put in such a position, and it is in this connection that we will see 
the matter most clearly if we focus directly on the distribution of the 
tenant population in terms of geographic and economic alternatives (i.e., 
the elasticities of their labor supply to an individual landlord), rather than 
trying to reach a summary characterization of the market as “competi- 
tive” or “coercive.” A distinctive feature of spatial competition is that 
even firms which are competitive in the usual sense will nonetheless 
attempt to practice discrimination among their buyers.ls My corner drug- 
gist may have some spatial market power, but if he cannot distinguish one 
customer from another, I will capture the full benefits of competition on 
the “fringe” even if I live next door. As soon as the druggist begins to give 
credit, however, the situation changes: The lender’s concern for the 
identity of the borrower will have to carry over beyond the immediate 
transaction. His desire for information and assurances is only reasonable, 
but in the process of this negotiation, he is also acquiring the means of 
discrimination. The fact that the druggist may be economically marginal 
will not give his intramarginal customers much protection. 
Ransom and Sutch have emphasized the merchant because it is easier 
to build a case for monopoly pricing there, but when one remembers that 
economic discrimination is an intimate aspect of spatial competition, 
these considerations apply with equal force to the landlord. Even a 
landlord who does not supply the “furnish” is engaged in a kind of 
“credit” transaction, in that he is renting out durable assets and is 
concerned for their treatment. Thus there is a difference between a wage 
system and tenancy: And that is that when we move from a situation in 
which one impersonal wage is obtainable to all comers to a world of 
heterogeneous one-on-one bargains with detailed specifications (as 
Reid emphasizes), discrimination in the economic sense is not only possi- 
ble but inevitable” And in a racist society, this economic discrimination 
will be highly correlated with race. The protections of the market are 
much weaker when economic discrimination is possible, because those 
who can be exploited probably will be, even while the more mobile 
tenants were able to drive hard bargains. The wide differences observed 
in land-labor ratios and in the fortunes of tenants are prima facie evi- 
I6 See Greenhut and Ohta, 1975: “A major difference-indeed the major difference- 
between spaceless and spatial price theory lies . . . in the premise that in classical economic 
theory competitors were conceived only to price nondiscriminatorily. while spatial competi- 
tors . . generally discriminate in price” (p. xiii). 
I7 Ir is not surprising that Higgs (1972) finds little discrimination in farm-labor wages, but 
the scope of this result may be narrow. Ransom and Sutch (footnote 63, p. 339) assert that 
share arrangements are different in these respects from fixed renting contracts, in which 
“the rent per acre is the subject of negotiation. but once set the renter may in principle take 
on as many acres as he wishes.” But because of the heterogeneity and vulnerability of land, 
I believe we will find that fixed rent agreements also specified a particular acreage as well as a 
rental fee. If so. then the element of discrimination is present here too. 
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dence that landlords were able to take advantage of limited geographic 
mobility on the part of tenants.‘* 
Ransom and Sutch are quite right to insist that plot sizes are not 
demographically determined, but were objects of bargaining and strategy; 
but it is also true that the same trends were encouraged by the essentially 
demographic fact of the rise in rural population relative to improved 
acreage. On this count, it may be that the war itself was more costly than 
Ransom and Sutch allow, because the absolute level of improved acreage 
had barely reached its 1860 levei by 1880 in the five-state area. In places, 
Ransom and Sutch seem to argue that landlords were actively holding 
back usable land (pp. 348, 351). Robinson and Eatwell, in the passage 
previously cited, also contemplate such a situation when they write: 
When there are not enough tenants to cultivate the whole area, the landlords will 
not let out such large holdings that output per acre falls very low; they prefer to 
keep a part of the land unlet . . . to prevent the peasants from becoming prosper- 
ous and independent. 
Perhaps this is the Ransom-Sutch position, and perhaps it does describe 
1870. But from the 1870s onward, it is difficult to understand an economic 
rationale for holding the major income-earning asset out of production as a 
regular matter. One suspects we need better evidence and a better argu- 
ment to buttress the claim that land was macroeconomically in surplus in 
1880. 
THE CHOICE OF TENURE 
Ransom and Sutch discuss the displacement of wage systems by 
sharecropping in detail (pp. 87-103), but as Engerman observed, they do 
not devote much attention to explaining temporal fluctuations and re- 
gional variations in tenure form; in general, our understanding of the 
coexistence of share and fixed-rent tenancies is limited. Robert Higgs 
views sharecropping as a risk-sharing arrangement, as contrasted with 
wage labor (where the planter bears the risk) and fixed-rent tenancy 
(where the tenant bears the risk). Higgs explains coexistence in terms of 
individual and local differences in risk aversion and the riskiness of crops; 
and changes over time (e.g., the rise of sharecropping after 1900) by 
changes in the riskiness of agriculture (caused by, e.g., the boll weevil).‘@ 
Reid, on the other hand, denies that sharecropping served this kind of 
risk-sharing function, on the grounds that landlords and laborers could 
obtain equivalent risk-return combinations by mixing portfolios of 
fixed-wage and fixed-rent bargains. He develops an alternative model, in 
which sharecropping has many efficiency advantages when tenants are 
young or inexperienced, because of the mutual incentives to share advice, 
I8 A geographic interpretation of racial differences appears in Decanio, 1974, Chap. 6. 
I0 Higgs. 1973. Higgs, 1977, pp. 67-68. 
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assistance, supervision, etc., throughout the crop year.e0 Ransom and 
Sutch, in rebuttal, note that the life-cycle farm-ladder hypothesis fits the 
data much better for whites than for blacks (p. 181), an observation which 
would be consistent with Reid’s analysis in conjunction with the 
Ransom-Sutch market signaling effect. 
We can’t settle all these issues here, but the principle of Occam’s razor 
suggests a simpler explanation, which emerges when one reflects on the 
fact that the wealthlessness of farm tenants imposes a constraint on the 
ability of landlords to avoid risk by fixing rents. No one can squeeze blood 
from a stone, and if the crop fails or the price of cotton falls out, the legal 
claim to a fixed rent is small consolation if the tenant is penniless. The 
constraints of wealth do not rigidly determine a set of tenure arrange- 
ments, but they clearly established bounds on the number of tenants who 
occupy the upper rungs of the ladder: farm ownership and fixed-rent 
tenancy. A wealthy man might choose to work on shares (and those who 
supplied mule and tools could and did work under the “thirds and 
fourths” system); but a poor man could not become a fixed-rent tenant 
until he raised the funds for his own mule and equipment. There are 
indications that this was the binding constraint in many cases: Nate Shaw 
tells of how he scraped together $100 for his own mule, borrowing the last 
$20 from his father-in-law, and he says: “Got me a mule and gived up 
working on halves. . . . Paid cash rent and made a profit from my 
farmin.” 
Hibbard’s 1913 survey of Southern Tenancy describes “a well-defined 
caste system among the tenants”? 
The lowest class is represented by those who furnish little equipment and 
receive half, or less, of the crop; above this comes the group whose independence 
is measured by the possession of a mule and a plow and the means of subsistence 
till harvest time; the highest class consists of those who can be trusted to deliver a 
certain quantity of crop or possibly a sum of money, and who are by that fact 
emancipated in the main from the directing authority of the landlord. 
Hibbard’s criteria clearly encompass Reid’s subjective elements, but they 
also indicate that asset-ownership and wealth were preconditions or 
entry-barriers into the renting class. Thus, the hypothesis suggests itself 
that the coexistence of tenure types and their relative change over time 
primarily reflect the success of farmers over time in accumulating and 
retaining assets, an accumulation which was constrained at any time by 
wealth. 
It is difficult to test this hypothesis, because the last census to collect 
ao Reid, 1973, 1976. 
a1 Rosengarten, 1975, pp. 117-l 18. 
e* Hibbard, 1913, p. 486. For other statements relating the move into renting to asset 
accumulation, see Brooks, 1912, pp. 60-65; Edwards, 1913, pp. 24-26. Compare Bell and 
Zusman, 1976, pp. 579-581. 
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household wealth data was 1870, and the first census to enquire into farm 
tenure was 1880. But I have carried out a limited test for Georgia in 1900, 
using county data on black wealth, collected by W. E. B. DuBois from tax 
records.23 This evidence indicates that the fraction of black farm tenants 
who are sharecroppers is negatively related to the average value of work- 
stock and tools owned by blacks (or other measures of wealth), and with 
the fraction of black farmers in a county. The regression is 
SHR 1.30 - 8.45* WLTH -O.OlO* %BL, RZ = 0.564, 
TEN= (2.85) TEN (5.3) 
where t ratios are in parenthesis. (The sample is 33 counties in the Georgia 
cotton belt for which data are available.) 
Wealth is, of course, correlated with age and experience, and this 
argument is not advanced as a wholesale substitute for Reid’s analysis. 
But the county data show much wider variations in levels of wealth than 
one would expect to see in age-experience structures, and the wealth 
hypothesis can readily account for the sharp differences in the age-tenure 
relationship for blacks and for whites. Finally, the analysis helps in 
understanding why the relative importance of sharecropping should have 
risen sharply after 1900 for both blacks and whites, at a time when the 
cotton economy was generally prosperous, and the percentage of black 
landowners was rising. It seems paradoxical, but there is a straightfor- 
ward reason: namely, that the price of mules doubled between 1899 and 
1905, and tripled between 1899 and 1918. Figure 2 depicts the dramatic 
developments. The same price pattern holds for mules of all ages and, 
because mules are transportable, for all parts of the South. The price of a 
mule was the main barrier between share and fixed-rent tenancy, and it 
appears that this barrier was rising faster than earnings, even while the 
landownership barrier was becoming a little more surmountable. One 
would expect the trends to diverge for the two assets, because land can be 
purchased in small and inferior lots, whereas mules are less divisible.H 
The rising barriers to the acquisition of mules, tools, and fixed-rent 
tenure had important social consequences as well, because there is reason 
to believe that the sharecroppers of 1910 had less of the day-to-day 
independence and decision-making scope described by Ransom and Sutch 
for the 1880s (pp. 94-99). The continuity in the names of census 
u DuBois, 1901. 
p4 It is difficult to determine from the available literature the precise reasons for the 
fluctuations in mule prices. Since three-fifths of U.S. mules were used in the South, one 
would expect that the cotton boom itself is part of the story. But mules were raised outside 
of the cotton areas, and the parallel trend in the price of horses (less than one-quarter of 
which were used in the South) suggest that supply-side pressures or competing demands 
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FIG. 2. Average prices, U.S. mules and horses, 1866-1920. Source: Historical Statistics 
of the U.S. (1976), Vol. I, pp. 200-201, 519-520. 
categories may in this respect be quite misleading. R. P. Brooks, writing 
in 1913, insisted that a sharecropper was little more than a share-wage 
day-laborer, and criticized earlier writers (notably Banks and Hammond) 
for treating sharecropping as a tenancy .25 Brooks, like many subsequent 
historians, may not have appreciated the changing and evolving character 
of Southern economic and racial relationships. We cannot be sure, be- 
cause we lack detailed knowledge of the degree of centralization of 
production decisions in either the earlier or later period, and we cannot 
safely rule out the possibility that black and white sharecropping were two 
quite different things with the same name. But if Ransom and Sutch are 
essentially correct in their account of the “one kind of freedom” which 
the former slaves had achieved by 1880, then the post-1900 reports 
suggest that even this limited household freedom had been badly eroded, 
under legal, social and racial pressures, by the time of World War I. 
Harold Woodman, in a useful discussion of these trends, suggests that the 
entire period be viewed in terms of “the making of a working class” of 
wage laborers, by analogy to the evolution of class relationships in indus- 
trial capitalism. 26 Applying Occam’s razor once again, however, I suggest 
that the more immediate reason for these developments was the renewed 
acceleration in world cotton demand after 1900. If this is right, then we 
have another example of the pattern which began with slavery, an inverse 
s Brooks, 1914, esp. pp. 66-68. Compare Banks, 1905; Hammond, 1897. 
I0 Woodman, 1977, pp. 551-554. 
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relationship between the demand for labor and the legal and social status 
of laborers without property. 
THE LIMITS TO PROGRESS 
The most important constraints to identify are the feasible limits to 
Southern economic progress in the 19th century. This is not the main 
focus of One Kind of Freedom, and their concluding chapter is largely a 
listing of various growth inhibiting effects with which, in qualitative 
terms, it is difficult to disagree. But the overall emphasis of the book, 
coupled with the statement that “the core of the problem of underde- 
velopment is institutional,” carries with it the implication that the perfor- 
mance of the agriculture sector could have made a significant difference in 
regional progress, and it is worth noting that there is room for doubt on 
this score. Did the region possess “all the requisite conditions for rapid 
economic growth” (p.7)? 
The hard economic facts of the Southern economy were that black and 
white fertility rates were far above the national average, and that between 
the Civil War and the turn of the century the natural growth of the rural 
population averaged nearly 2% per year-about as fast as the growth of 
world cotton demand during this period, and substantially faster than the 
growth of land on farms. Outmigration from agriculture made very little 
dent in these rates. Rubin (1975) makes a strong case that geography 
seriously constrained Southern efforts at diversification, and the unfortu- 
nate truth is that the harshest critics of cotton were unable to suggest an 
alternative source of cash income for farmers. A broadening of land- 
ownership and self-sufficiency in food crops would have been equitable 
and humane, and might even have raised cotton prices; but there is not 
much reason to believe that such a program would have generated sus- 
tained progress. As Engerman has stressed, the examples of emancipa- 
tions where the freedmen had access to land do not encourage optimism 
that the dictates of equity and progress will necessarily coincide. We can 
all agree that Southern agriculture could have been more progressive; but 
rapid productivity growth in the cotton sector would have been of little 
help to rural incomes if labor had no outlet. One of the reasons (among 
many) for the slow development of the mechanical cotton picker was the 
inventors’ belief that the machine would inflict misery on the Southern 
poor?’ 
To understand Southern poverty, therefore, we will have to look into 
the determinants of population growth, the obstacles to Southern indus- 
trialization and the course of migration to Northern jobs. It may well be 
that the institutions of Southern agriculture have a role to play on each of 
z’ Street, 1957, pp. 62-64. 
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these points, and such a study will be able to build on the research of 
Ransom and Sutch. But the connections remain to be developed pre- 
cisely, and the full story will have to include American immigration 
policies and the labor and investment strategies of American business. To 
understand fully the roots of Southern poverty, we will need a national 
and international perspective. 
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